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The First Amendment and Its
Protections
By

THE HONORABLE ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG*

Now is the time for all good men and women to come to the
aid of the First Amendment.
It is under attack.
The Supreme Court has recently held that journalists, over
the objection of a defendant, may not be admitted to pretrial hearings,1 although most criminal cases are disposed of by plea bargaining, a form of pretrial hearing.
The search of a student newspaper pursuant to a general warrant has been upheld, notwithstanding that a simple subpoena
2
would have served every legitimate governmental interest.
Newspaper reporters have been sentenced to jail for failure to
reveal their sources despite the fact that those sources were distrustful of government and would only confide to the reporters
under a pledge of confidentiality.3
Judges have issued gag orders preventing comment on sotrials on the ground that publicity would undermine
called public
fair trials. 4
The Court's opinions on what is obscene are, to say the least,
unilluminating. The best clarification it has been able to proffer is
that of Justice Stewart, who could not define it, but said, "I know
it when I see it."
The strictures against libel laws enunciated in New York
Former Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
1. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
2. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
3. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
*

4.
5.

See Nebraska Press Aas'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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Times Co. v. Sullivan6 have been cut back, and libel laws revital7
ized in the area of public conduct.
The establishment clause of the First Amendment has been
weakened to permit varying forms of aid to parochial schools.8
Notwithstanding the opinion of the Supreme Court outlawing
prayers in public schools, 9 Congress and the state legislatures, with
widespread public support, are seeking to circumvent the Supreme
Court's prayer decision. 10
There is also increasing public opposition to peaceful speech
and demonstrations by unpopular groups.
In light of this assault on the First Amendment, it is appropriate to analyze its meaning and its importance to the functioning of
our democratic society.
The First Amendment, as its title indicates, is article I of the
Bill of Rights. It provides:
Congress shall make no laws respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of people peaceably to
assemble, 11
and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.
One will note from this language that the First Amendment is
absolute in its terms. Congress shall make no laws. No statement
could be more categoric than this.
Justice Cardozo referred to the First Amendment as the "preferred" freedom which lies at the very core of our democracy. 12 He
aptly said freedom of expression is "the matrix, the indispensable
condition of nearly every form of freedom." ' 3
6. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
7. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323 (1974).
8. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980);
Woman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
9. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
10. The Helms Amendment, passed by the Senate and pending before the House Judiciary Committee, would exempt any state regulation of prayer in public schools from review
by the federal courts. S. 450, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 126 CONG. REC. D1157 (1980).
11. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
12. For an analysis (and criticism) of the concept of the First Amendment as a "preferred" freedom, see Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S.
77, 90-96 (1949).
13. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
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Why, then, is the plain language of the Constitution limited,
or in some cases even disregarded?
The assigned reason, in many instances, is our national security. Limitation, in an undefined way, is said to be necessary for the
common defense.
William Pitt, the elder, said, "Necessity is the plea for every
infringement of human freedom. It is the argument of tyrants; it is
' '14
the creed of slaves.
The basic creed of First Amendment safeguards was eloquently expressed long ago (1937) by Chief Justice Charles Evan
Hughes in these words:
The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from
incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the
constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly
in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion,
to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the
people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful
means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government. 15
This great Chief Justice also said, in the case of Near v. Min6 that prior restraint of publication
nesota,"
negated the essential
purpose of the First Amendment.1 Prior restraint, in layman's
terms, means censorship-and censorship is the direct antithesis of
18
freedom of speech and of the press.
Trial judges, presumably with the sanction of the Supreme
Court, are issuing gag orders, preventing reporters from saying in
the press or on television what is going on in a public trial. The
alleged justification for such gag orders is that they are necessary
to ensure defendants fair trials which might be prejudiced by excessive publicity. In legal terms, judges are "balancing" the First
Amendment right to a free press against Sixth Amendment safe14.

Speech by William Pitt, House of Commons (Nov. 18, 1783) reprinted in J. BART-

urr,BARTLmr's

FAMILAR -QUOTATIONS

496 (14th ed. 1968).

15. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937).
16. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
17. Id. at 713-23.
18. Chief Justice Hughes concluded that "[i]f such a statute, authorizing suppression
...
is constitutionally valid,... it would be but a itep to a complete system of censorship." Id. at 721.
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guards of a fair trial.19 And the balance is being weighed in favor of
the Sixth Amendment to the prejudice of the First.2 0
I personally can see no justification for gag orders. I have been
a lawyer and a judge for more than fifty years. I am firmly committed to the principle that anyone accused of a crime is entitled to a
fair trial. But there are ways of ensuring a fair trial and guarding
against the influence of excessive publicity on juries without
resorting to gag orders.
Juries may be sequestered and denied access during the course
of a trial to newspapers and television. The venue of a trail may be
removed from a locality which has been saturated with excess publicity to one which, in popular parlance, could not care less about
the trial in question. And jurors are not foolish men and women.
Studies show that juries are singularly unaffected by publicity in
cases before them.2 1 By and large juries reach their verdicts on the
evidence before them.
As I have said earlier, reporters are lodged in jail because they
have refused to reveal their sources. I should have thought that we
would have learned from Watergate that to expose corruption by
those in high office, reporters need confidential sources and must
protect these sources in order to gain the information essential for
such exposures.
This is not to say that reporters can or are entitled to claim
immunity from testifying as to their own personal observation of
criminal actions; in such a situation, they must testify like the rest
of us. Nor is it to say that sources should not be revealed where the
information derived is not such as to jeopardize sources from governmental retribution. It is to say that in those special cases where
sources will only speak to journalists because of reasonable fear of
governmental retribution, then those sources should be protected.
And, I think it entirely nonsensical that, with or without a
warrant, the offices of student newspapers should be ransacked
when a subpoena, subject to challenge, will serve the purpose of
19. In Gannett, the Supreme Court noted with approval that "the trial court balanced
the 'constitutional rights of the press and the public' against the 'defendants' right to a fair
trial." Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 392.
20. See id. at 393.
21.

See

TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, INC., RIGHTS IN CONFLICT: REPORT OF THE TWENTI-

ETH CENTURY TASK FORCE ON JUSTICE, PUBLICITY & THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1976).
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law enforcement.2 2 I am not aware that in our country such newspapers-whatever their political views-constitute a clear and present danger to our government.2 3
I simply could not conceive that the Supreme Court, despite
its language in a case already decided about pretrial hearings,
would hold that the defendant alone can determine whether a trial
should be public or private. We, the people, have an interest in
public trials. The history of Ango-American law demonstrates the
evils arising from Star Chamber proceedings. The situation in totalitarian countries, such as the Soviet Union, bears witness that

closed trials are a menace to the freedoms we cherish. I was confident that upon reflection the court would not endorse secret trials.
My confidence is vindicated by the Court's decision in Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia. 4
The cases involving the First Amendment separation of
church and state lack consistency, and evidence a desire to permit
more aid to parochial education and preference for religion than

the Constitution and the Founding Fathers envisioned. 25
We are again becoming intolerant of dissenting voices, forget22. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). In one recent case the offices of
a Boise, Idaho, television station (KBCI TV) were searched pursuant to a general search
warrant for video taped interviews with inmates at the Idaho state penitentiary taped during a prison riot in July. Open Up, It's the Police, TnME, Aug. 11, 1980, at 55. The prosecutor intended to use the tapes as evidence against the rioting prisoners and also intended to
call reporter Bob Loy, who made the tapes, as a witness for the prosecution. Loy had gone
into the prison at the request of the inmates. N.Y. Times, July 28, 1980, § A, at 14, col. 1.
23. In response to the decision in Zurcher, Congress has passed legislation designed to
protect journalists from such searches which was signed by the President on October 13,
1980. The Privacy Protection Act of 1980, P.L. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (1980). In a recent
letter to leaders of the House and Senate, current editors of the Stanford Daily claimed
that since the 1971 raid on the Daily, in at least 26 instances "police have used search
warrants to 'harass, intimidate and terrorize' the news media, doctors, lawyers and others
not suspected of crime themselves." The Recorder, Aug. 13, 1980, at 1, col. 2. Acknowledging
that the bills passed do protect journalists, they accuse Congress of "knuckl[ing] under to
law enforcement groups" and failing to act upon the more than 20 bills that would protect
the privacy of all Americans. See, e.g., H.R. 368, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. H166
(1979) (currently pending before the House Committees on Judiciary and Interstate and
Foreign Commerce). Their compilation cites searches pursuant to warrants of newspapers
(Berkeley Barb, Los Angeles Star, Flint Michigan Voice), television and radio stations
(KPFA, Berkeley, Ca.; KPOO, KRON, KPIX, KGO, San Francisco, Ca.; KTVO, Oakland;
KPFK, Los Angeles; WJAR, Providence, R.I.) as well as attorney files and medical records.
24. 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980).
25. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980);
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 8:5

ful that our nation was founded and forged by dissenters and that
while they are often misguided, on occasion they are right. The
First Amendment protects freedom of expression: as a corollary, it
imposes a duty to listen to views which, at first blush, we deem
abhorrent.
When I was on the Supreme Court we handed down an opinion saying that First Amendment freedoms need "breathing space"
to survive."6 This is an elementary truth and we must be eternally
vigilant to ensure that "breathing space" is provided. But the simple fact is that the First Amendment is being denied adequate
"breathing space."
This is not to say that the Supreme Court has not vindicated
First Amendment rights on a number of occasions and in important cases. The Pentagon Papers case 27 is a classic application of
the doctrine that prior restraint is inimical to First Amendment
safeguards. But in totality, who can deny that protection of the
right to free speech and a free press is all too often honored in the
breach rather than in the observance?
Public opinion polls demonstrate that the public is cynical
about what it reads in newspapers and hears on the tube. I share
this cynicism. Much of what we read and hear is neither accurate
nor informative. Unscrupulous politicians are not the only demagogues among us. Some newspaper columnists, editorial writers
and reporters can be demagogic also.
In this day and age of chain newspapers and of network reporting, there is all too little exercise of the responsibility implicit
in the liberty accorded by the First Amendment. If the press is to
remain free, it must be responsible. As long as it is responsible, it
will remain free. The temptation is great to restrain or censor irresponsible reporting in the interest of truth and accuracy. But as
Benjamin Franklin said more than 200 years ago: "Of course, we
ought to prevent abuses of the Press; but to whom do we entrust
the power of doing so?"

26. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
27. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).

